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| analysis.table_country | analysis.table_status | analysis.table_strategy | analysis.table_year |
|---|---|---|---|
| Égypte | Organisation Terroriste | Éradication par la Force | 2013 |
| Arabie Saoudite | Organisation Terroriste | Éradication par la Force | 2014 |
| Émirats Arabes Unis | Organisation Terroriste | Éradication par la Force | 2014 |
| France | Organisation Terroriste | Surveillance et Contrôle | N/A |
| Tunisie | Organisation Terroriste | Démantèlement Légaliste | N/A |
| République Arabe Syrienne | Interdite | Confrontation Militaire | 1970 |
| Jordanie | Interdite | Démantèlement Légaliste | 2020 |
| Royaume de Bahreïn | Organisation Terroriste | Confrontation Militaire | 2017 |
| Russie | Organisation Terroriste | Surveillance et Contrôle | 2003 |
| Libye | Organisation Terroriste | Confrontation Militaire | 2012 |
The Three Strategic Models
Model 1: Eradication by Force and Law
Egypt, Syria, UAE, Saudi Arabia
This model relies on the total criminalization of the organization. The most emblematic measure is the classification of the brotherhood as a terrorist organization. This designation provides the legal framework for massive and uncompromising repression.
Main Features:
- ::In Egypt: 2013 classification, mass trials, thousands of death sentences, systematic asset confiscation
- ::In Syria: Law No. 49 of 1980 making membership punishable by death, Hama massacre in 1982
- ::In UAE: Mass trials 'UAE94' (2013) and 'UAE84' (2024), dismantling of the local Al-Islah branch
Impact and Efficiency:
High efficiency in dismantling organizational structures, but at the cost of brutal repression, massive human rights violations, and potential radicalization of some members driven underground. The common impact is the consolidation of an authoritarian regime using counter-terrorism to eliminate all forms of political opposition.
Model 2: Legalist and Progressive Dismantling
Jordan, Tunisia
This approach avoids direct and brutal confrontation in favor of progressive asphyxiation through legal and political means. The goal is to neutralize the movement without provoking a popular uprising.
Main Features:
- ::In Jordan: Recognition of a dissident faction (2015), dissolution by the Court of Cassation (2020), formal ban (2025)
- ::In Tunisia: Suspension of Parliament (2021), prosecution for 'conspiracy against the state', closure of premises without formal party ban
Impact and Efficiency:
The strategy minimizes the risk of popular uprising while achieving the neutralization goal. In Tunisia, short-term efficiency is undeniable, but the long-term impact is the end of the democratic experiment and a risk of return to more clandestine and potentially more radical forms of Islamism.
Model 3: Surveillance and Control
France, Bahrain, Russia
In liberal democracies (France) or mixed regimes (Bahrain, Russia), a total ban is either legally complex or strategically avoided. The strategy focuses on fighting 'separatism', financing, and subversive activities, without necessarily banning the ideology itself.
Main Features:
- ::In France: 2021 'Separatism' Law, administrative dissolution of associations (CCIF, BarakaCity), Charter of Principles of Islam in France
- ::In Russia: Terrorist classification since 2003 for internal security reasons (Chechnya), strict surveillance
Impact and Efficiency:
Limited efficiency due to rule of law constraints. While financing and influence networks are disrupted, ideological influence persists via social media and informal structures. The strategy is often criticized for the risk of stigmatizing the Muslim community.